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  This paper aims to compare the macroeconomic performance of three European socialist economies 
(Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia) with developing and developed countries during the eighties. Using panel data 
for 87 countries, we measure macroeconomic performance with two frontier efficiency techniques: the stochastic 
frontier approach, and the time-varying WITHIN model proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990). We 
conclude in favor of the underperformance of socialist countries in relation to developed countries but also to 
developing countries, which may be explained by the features of the socialist economic system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As regularly emphasized by Soviet leaders
1, the major economic objective of the Soviet 
model of socialist economy, which was introduced in the whole Eastern Europe after 1945 
was growth. This purpose was notably motivated by the catching-up of the most advanced 
countries to prove the superiority of socialism. The slowdown of growth in European socialist 
economies in the 80s was therefore very negative for these regimes, as they had still not 
caught up Western economies at that time. 
This slowdown may be linked to the extensive nature of growth in socialist economies. 
Indeed, these economies have increased their production through labor and capital 
accumulation during decades. However, labor accumulation reached a predictable limit, while 
capital suffered from decreasing returns since the end of the 50s. The extensive growth in 
socialist economies has therefore to be relied to the result of recent literature on growth 
(Easterly and Levine, 2001) that the leading driving force behind growth performances may 
not be the evolution of productivity rather than factor accumulation. It therefore appears that 
what matters for growth is not only the amount of factors of production with which a country 
is endowed or which it has accumulated but also, and chiefly, the way in which it combines 
those factors. This may explain the slowdown of growth in European socialist economies in 
the 80s but also more generally the failure of these economies in the catching-up of Western 
economies at that time. 
It is consequently of the highest interest to determine the ability of European socialist 
economies to make the most of their factor endowment in order to check the relevance of this 
view. To this end, we apply frontier efficiency techniques to estimate macroeconomic 
performance of a large set of countries including some European socialist countries. Namely, 
we assess technical efficiency, which measures how close a country’s production is to what a 
country’s optimal production would be for using the same bundle of inputs. Thus, it brings 
some evidence with respect to the relative total factor productivity of a country. In 
comparison with our study, most studies on the measurement of aggregate productivity of 
socialist countries use standard tools of performance such as output per worker or more 
sophisticated measures such as total factor productivity (e.g. Bergson, 1987). 
                                                 
1 Gros and Steinherr (1995) mention that Stalin’s claim in 1947 that he would catch up with Western countries in 
ten years was repeated ten years later by Khrushchev.   3
Frontier efficiency techniques provide sophisticated measures of performance, the 
efficiency scores, which have three advantages in comparison with other measures of 
performance. First, it provides synthetic measures of performance. Indeed, unlike basic 
productivity measures (e.g. per capita income), the efficiency scores allow to include several 
input dimensions in the evaluation of performances. As a result, the income of a country is not 
only compared to labor stock, but also to stocks of physical capital and human capital. 
Second, it computes relative measures of performance. Namely, a production frontier is 
estimated which allows the comparison of each country to the best-practice countries. As a 
result, the efficiency score assesses how close a country’s production is to what a country’s 
optimal production would be for using the same bundle of inputs. It then directly provides a 
relative measure of performance. Third, whereas total factor productivity measures assess 
performance by the whole residual from the production frontier for each country, econometric 
frontier efficiency techniques (e.g. both approaches applied in this work) allow to disentangle 
the distance to the production frontier between an inefficiency term and a random error, 
taking exogenous events into account. 
Two studies have formerly adopted frontier efficiency techniques to compare 
macroeconomic performance of European socialist economies with Western economies 
(Moroney and Lovell, 1997, Koop et al. 2000). These works both use econometric frontier 
techniques to estimate technical efficiency at the aggregate level. We provide three major 
additions to these former studies. 
First, we include human capital as an input in the analysis. Indeed, the cross-country 
differences in human capital must be taken in the measures, unless technical efficiency would 
be incorrect. However both applications of efficiency frontiers take labor and capital into 
account but neglect human capital. Second, both frontier efficiency studies compare 
productivity studies compare productivity of European socialist economies only with Western 
economies. However, it is also relevant to proceed to a comparison of these economies with 
economies at other stages of development. Indeed, the collapse of socialist systems in Europe 
may be such that socialist countries would be even below developing countries. The inclusion 
of human capital may notably play a role on this issue, as socialist countries may have better-
skilled labor force than developing countries, without succeeding in having a greater output 
per worker. 
Third, we apply two different approaches to estimate technical efficiency. Indeed the 
results of the frontier efficiency applications might be sensitive to the adopted methodological 
choices. It has to be stressed that literature in banking, in which these techniques are   4
commonly resorted to, provides ambiguous evidence with respect to the robustness of these 
techniques (Weill, 2004). Therefore, the use of two techniques appears a natural robustness 
check of our results. We utilize the stochastic frontier approach, which is commonly adopted 
in empirical works appraising macroeconomic technical efficiency (e.g. Adkins et al., 2002, 
Méon and Weill, 2004). Furthermore, the use of panel data allows us to apply the time-
varying WITHIN model proposed by Cornwell et al. (1990). Both techniques use econometric 
tools to compute technical efficiency and consider that the distance from the frontier includes 
an inefficiency term and a random error. However they differ on the method adopted to 
separate random error from inefficiency term. While the stochastic frontier approach makes 
some assumptions on the distributions of random error and inefficiency term, the WITHIN 
model takes advantage of the panel data not to impose such assumptions. 
Technical efficiency is therefore estimated at the aggregate level on a panel sample of 
87 countries for the period 1980-1987. The sample includes all groups of countries, meaning 
developed and developing countries apart from the European socialist countries. We consider 
three of these latter countries: Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. We restrict our analysis to 
these three countries because of limitations to have comparable data. They represent however 
a particularly interesting set of socialist economies because, as mentioned by Whitesell 
(1985), they correspond to three different kinds of what a socialist economy in Europe was in 
the 80s. 
The Polish economic system was very similar to the Soviet model in application in most 
Eastern European socialist countries. However the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism in 1968 and the reforms implemented in the early 80s put Hungary into reforms. 
The most notable changes were the policies in favor of private ownership and the efforts to 
introduce some economic rationality in prices, concluded by price liberalization in 1985. 
Furthermore, the country adhered to IMF and World Bank already in 1982. In comparison 
with the Hungarian economy, the Yugoslavian one was even farer of the Soviet model. The 
most striking feature was workers’ self-management of industrial companies since the 50s, 
which resulted in a decentralized decision-making. Moreover, the degree of openness of the 
economy was relatively high with notably export incentives for firms and allowance of joint-
ventures with Western companies. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical and empirical 
background of the differences in productivity between socialist economies and market 
economies. Methodology is described in section 3, followed by data and variables in section   5





There is a commonly accepted view that market economies benefit from higher 
productivity than socialist economies. This view is supported by a set of theoretical arguments 
and empirical studies, briefly surveyed in this section. Several theoretical arguments can be 
advanced in favor of a backwardness in productivity for socialist economies in comparison 
with market economies. They are linked to the characteristics of these economies, such as 
public ownership, planning, or right to work. 
First of all, public ownership of means of production may have negative consequences 
on productivity (Shleifer, 1997), which result from failures in the innovation process but also 
in the incentives to reduce costs. Indeed, the owner of a private company receives more 
rewards of his innovations and of his efforts to cut costs than the manager of a public 
company, sharing all benefits resulting from his positive decisions. Second, the planning 
system did not favor productivity. Employees and managers were not inclined to surpass plan 
targets, as the benefits associated with such a performance were very limited. Even more 
important, planning favored the excessive use of inputs, as plant managers were inclined to 
ask for more labor to increase the chances that plan targets were met. Finally, in terms of 
innovation, planning was a considerable impediment to changes, as its hierarchical nature was 
not accurately adaptable to them, but also because changes complicated planning processes, 
as observed by Whitesell (1994). 
Third, employees had the constitutional right to guaranteed employment
2, while income 
differentials were limited for egalitarian reasons. Therefore, there was neither stick through 
the fear of unemployment, nor carrot with hopes of higher wages to provide good incentives 
for the effort of employees. This argument is supported by Bergson (1994) who emphasized 
the role of low labor effort in the backwardness in productivity of socialist economies. 
Moreover Drago (1989) empirically showed a positive link between unemployment and 
productivity on a sample of socialist and Western market economies. Fourth, the socialist 
economy was distinguished by the prevalence of seller’s markets. Namely, it conveys the idea 
                                                 
2 The Article 40 of the Soviet Constitution of 1979 states that “Citizens of the USSR have the right to work (that 
is, to guaranteed employment).”   6
that the economy was not driven by demand as in market economies, but by supply because of 
the low attention paid to consumers’ desires and of the limited number of suppliers. This 
feature led to a lower degree of competition, and consequently in lower productivity for 
companies. 
Fifth, a policy choice of the Soviet system, which is not inherent to the socialist 
ideology, was to favor the national self-sufficiency to be the most independent of the market 
economies. This characteristic results in a weak openness of socialist economies to foreign 
trade, which may also influence productivity in a negative way. Indeed, open economies trade 
goods but also ideas through technological and managerial know-how (Romer, 1993). This 
point is of utmost interest for backwarded economies, which have on average more to gain 
from ideas to implement. Therefore, the closeness to trade of socialist economies may also 
have contributed to the productivity gap between socialist and market economies. Sixth, the 
socialist economies may have difficulties resulting from the poor quality of institutions, with 
notably the lack of political freedom, a weak quality of the administration, and corruption. As 
recent evidence pointed out the negative influence of bad governance on macroeconomic 
technical efficiency (Adkins et al., 2002, Méon and Weill, 2004), the poor quality of 
institutions in socialist economies may exert a negative impact on productivity. It has to be 
stressed that this feature can only explain the lower productivity of European socialist 
economies in relation to Western economies, but not to developing countries which suffer 
also from poor quality of institutions, as shown by Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
In summary, literature provides a wide range of arguments explaining the negative 
impact of the characteristics of European socialist economies on productivity. Empirical 
literature tends to support such a view as described now. 
A major study on comparative productivity between European socialist and Western 
economies is Bergson (1987)’s. Assembling data for four European socialist countries (USSR, 
Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia) and 7 Western countries for 1975, he adopts two different 
techniques to estimate the productivity gap between both groups of countries. On the one 
hand, he measures output per worker with and without an adjustment with labor quality, and 
then shows that socialist economies underperform Western economies for a magnitude 
ranging between 25 and 34%. On the other hand, he estimates a production function including 
three inputs (labor, capital, land) and a dummy variable for socialist economies. He then 
concludes to a lower productivity for socialist economies. 
Two studies use frontier efficiency techniques to assess technical efficiency of socialist 
economies in comparison with Western economies. Moroney and Lovell (1997) estimate a   7
production frontier on a sample of 24 countries, including 7 European socialist economies for 
the period 1978-1980. They adopt a variant of the stochastic frontier approach for their 
estimation, and consider capital, labor, and energy as inputs. Their conclusion clearly supports 
the outperformance of Western economies, with socialist economies 76% as efficiently as 
Western economies. They also observe a relative heterogeneity of the efficiency scores 
between socialist economies: the efficiency scores indeed range from 68.8% for Hungary to 
82.6% for Bulgaria, representing the production potential of each economy in comparison 
with market economies. 
Koop et al. (2000) adopt a Bayesian stochastic frontier model to estimate technical 
efficiency. The choice of this model, scarcely adopted in frontier efficiency works, is 
motivated by the small size of the dataset. Using data for labor and capital for Poland, 
Yugoslavia and 20 Western economies for the decade 1980-1990, they conclude to an 
impressive underperformance of Poland with an average efficiency of 45% over the period. 
Western economies have mean efficiency scores ranging from 80.9 to 97.5%, if we except 
Greece with 69.4%. Finally, Yugoslavia has a very high efficiency level (93.2%). In 
summary, this brief survey of empirical literature on the comparative productivity of socialist 
and market economies tends to support the underperformance of socialist economies relative 
to developed economies. 
A final remark must be stressed here, before turning to the empirical investigation. The 
countries to which we compare European socialist economies can not be all considered as full 
market economies. Indeed, even if developed countries are all market economies, developing 
countries represent different mixes of features from market economies and planned 
economies: to mention the extremes, our sample of developing countries ranges from China to 
Chile. However, our arguments to explain the backwardness in productivity for socialist 
economies in comparison with market economies can be useful to understand the observed 
results for mainly two reasons. The first reason is that most developing countries have some 
features of market economies, and consequently at least some of the six theoretical arguments 
presented above are relevant to explain the possible productivity gap. The second reason is 
that even developing economies with a socialist system present some differences with the 
Soviet model of socialist economy, which may also explain some differences in productivity 
with the European socialist economies. 
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3. Methodology 
 
Our aim is to measure macroeconomic technical efficiency of countries in the 80s to 
proceed to a comparison between European socialist countries and other groups of countries 
in the world. A Cobb-Douglas functional form is assumed for the production frontier.
3 We 
assume constant returns-to-scale because, as Moroney and Lovell (1997, p.1086) observe it, 
“at the economy-wide level, constant returns-to-scale is virtually compelling”. The production 
frontier is then as follows: 
ln (Y/L)i = α0 + α1 ln (K/L)i + α2 ln (H/L)i +  εi      ( 1 )  
where i = 1,…, 87 indexes countries. (Y/L), (K/L), and (H/L) are respectively output per 
worker, capital per worker, and human capital per worker, and are described below. 
A panel data set is used to estimate technical efficiency at the aggregate level with two 
different techniques. The first technique is the cross-sectional stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA) to measure technical efficiency at the aggregate level. This approach was adopted in 
most works on macroeconomic technical efficiency (e.g. Adkins et al., 2002, Méon and Weill, 
2004). 
Stochastic frontier approach assumes that the error term of the production frontier, εi, is 
the sum of two independent random variables: a random disturbance, vi, and an inefficiency 
term ui. vi is a two-sided component representing random disturbances, reflecting luck or 
measurement errors. vi is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 
σv² . ui is a one-sided component capturing technical inefficiencies. Several distributions have 
been proposed in the literature for this component: half-normal, truncated normal, gamma, 
exponential. As is common in the literature, we assume a half-normal distribution with 
variance σu² for the inefficiency term. 
According to Jondrow et al. (1982), country-specific estimates of inefficiency terms can 
be calculated by using the distribution of the inefficiency term conditional to the estimate of 
the composite error term. The estimate of the technical inefficiency is then the mean of its 
conditional distribution:  () ( )
() * / * F 1
* / * f * * / u E i i σ µ
σ µ σ µ ε − −
− + =  where σ²  = σu²+σv²,  µ∗ = −σu²εi/σ², 
σ∗² = σu²σv²/σ², f and F represent the standard normal density and cumulative distribution 
                                                 
3 Two reasons motivate the choice of the Cobb-Douglas form. First, it is commonly used in empirical works on 
growth and on aggregate efficiency frontiers technical efficiency. Second, in his estimation of production 
functions with CES and translog forms for European socialist countries, Whitesell (1985) showed that the Cobb-
Douglas was the most appropriate form to describe growth in these countries.   9
functions. We use the Frontier software version 4.1 by Coelli (1996) to perform the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the stochastic frontier model. We then estimate a production frontier 
for each year of the period. 
The second technique is the time-varying WITHIN model proposed by Cornwell, 
Schmidt and Sickles (1990)
4, which has never been employed to our knowledge to compute 
macroeconomic technical efficiency. By using panel data, this model does not require 
distributional assumptions on the inefficiency term and the random disturbance. It specifies 
the inefficiency terms at different periods as a quadratic function of time in which coefficients 
vary over countries. The inefficiency term at period t uit is then modeled as follows: 
uit= θ1i + θ2i t + θ3i t²          ( 2 )  
where i indexes country, t represents time, and the θs are cross-section country-specific 
parameters. 
It has to be stressed that an important difference between both frontier efficiency models 
is that the SFA model allows the coefficients of the production frontier to vary over time, 
which permits the technology changes during the period. This may notably lead to some 





If we exclude human capital, data are the same as in Easterly and Levine (2001) and 
were downloaded from the Penn World Tables 5.6.
5. We use data for 87 countries for the 
period 1980-1987. Output (Y) is measured as GDP in purchasing power parity dollars. Capital 
(K) is measured as aggregate investment, which is a measure of capital stock based on a 
perpetual inventory method, provided by Easterly and Levine (2001). Labor (L) is assessed by 
the number of workers. Human capital (H) is measured as the total number of years of 
schooling in the working-age population over 15 years old, and is taken from the Barro-
Lee (2000) education dataset and was downloaded from the Economic Growth Resources 
website. 
                                                 
4 An alternative technique would have been the time-varying model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992). 
However it assumes identical variations in efficiency for all countries during the period, which is a very strong 
assumption not allowing the comparative analysis of the evolution of efficiency.   10
An important remark concerns the importance of the underground economy which may 
affect the technical efficiency measures. Indeed, it can be argued that our estimates are wrong 
because they ignore the effective output produced by a country, meaning the sum of official 
and underground outputs, by considering the official output. However, as observed by 
Bergson (1987), this underestimation of the effective output of the economy also affects the 
inputs. Consequently, our estimates of the technical efficiency based on official figures can be 
considered as satisfactory proxies of the effective technical efficiency, as official figures for 
outputs and inputs underestimate effective figures in a proportion we can assume similar. 
We use a balanced sample for the period 1980-1987. The sample includes 3 European 
socialist countries (Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia), and three other groups of countries 
following the World Bank classification: 25 lower-income countries, 34 middle-income 
countries (we gather here the so-called ‘upper-income’ and ‘middle-income’ developing 
countries of the classification), and 25 developed countries. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in table 1a by group of countries, and 
in table 1b for the three European socialist countries. Our data are consistent with the 
established view that output per worker is higher in developed countries than in socialist and 
lower-income countries. Furthermore, socialist and middle-income countries have similar 
levels of output per worker, representing four times the mean of lower-income countries. We 
can draw a parallel between these statistics and those for capital per worker. Indeed, we 
observe a clear hierarchy with in descending order developed, socialist, middle-income and 
lower-income countries. Therefore, the fact that capital per worker is undoubtedly greater in 
socialist countries than in middle-income countries, while both groups of countries have 
similar levels of output per worker, tends to suggest a lower total factor productivity in 
socialist countries than in middle-income countries. This is a first clue for smaller technical 
efficiency in socialist countries in comparison with other groups of countries. 
Finally, we observe that human capital per worker is greater in the three European 
socialist countries than in middle-income and lower-income countries, while it is slightly 
lower than in developed countries. These observations provide information on the possible 
impact of taking human capital into consideration for technical efficiency measures. Indeed 
this suggests that, while the inclusion of human capital would not increase the possible 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 Koop et al. (2000) also used the Penn World Table for their estimation of technical efficiency of Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Western countries. They consider that “the Penn World Table provides the best currently-
available data that allows for reliable cross-country comparisons” (p.186).   11
backwardness of socialist economies in comparison with developed countries, it would 
considerably increase it in comparison to lower-income or middle-income countries. 
 
Table 1a 










N 3  25  34  25 
Y/L 10,188.23  2,545.53  9,777.47  23,165.43 
K/L  31,518.27 2,711.34 15,463.38  57,814.26 
H/L 12.78  3.46  9.00  13.80 
Y/L, K/L, H/L, are respectively output per worker, capital per worker, and human capital per worker. 
 
Table 1b 
Summary statistics on variables: socialist economies 
 
 Hungary  Poland  Yugoslavia 
Y/L 10,765.38  7,896.63  11,904.50 
K/L 29,565.34  32,109.12  32,880.35 
H/L 14.35  12.69  11.31 
Y/L, K/L, H/L, are respectively output per worker, capital per worker, and human capital per worker. 
 
The investigation of the three socialist countries points out a hierarchy for output per 
worker with in descending order Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. Similar levels of capital 
per worker are observed in Poland and Yugoslavia, suggesting a lower technical efficiency for 
Poland, while the Hungarian level is smaller. Finally, human capital endowment is the highest 
in Hungary, followed in descending order by Poland and Yugoslavia. It is consequently 
difficult to extract some insights on the hierarchy of these three countries in terms of technical 
efficiency from the descriptive statistics of inputs and output. 
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5. Results 
 
This section presents the empirical results of the frontier efficiency models. We first 
display the results obtained with the SFA model in tables 2a and 2b. Several conclusions 
come out. First, the most striking result is the underperformance of socialist countries in 
comparison with all other groups of countries. Indeed the average efficiency scores over the 
period are 70.41%, 76.53%, and 82.15%, respectively for lower-income, middle-income, and 
developed countries, to be compared with 59.25% for socialist countries. Second, the 
efficiency gap between socialist countries and other groups of countries rather increased 
between 1980 and 1987. Indeed a decrease in efficiency occurred for socialist countries 
during this period (-1.83 points), as it was also the case for middle-income countries, whereas 
lower-income and developed countries improved their efficiency. 
Third, the comparison of efficiency between socialist countries shows very different 
levels of average efficiency over the period, with in ascending order Poland (48.33%), 
Hungary (62.31%), and Yugoslavia (67.09%). These rankings tend to support the view that 
market-oriented reforms favored efficiency in socialist economies, as Hungary and especially 
Yugoslavia implemented some market economy features. Fourth, in considering the 
evolution, a catching-up process occurred for Hungary and Poland to Yugoslavia during the 
80s, as efficiency fell in this latter country in opposition to the observed improvement in both 
other countries. Thus, we can point out that the observed reduction in efficiency for socialist 
countries between 1980 and 1987 is due to the Yugoslavian case. 
We now turn to the empirical results obtained with the WITHIN model, which are 
displayed in tables 3a and 3b. The efficiency scores are then lower than with the SFA model, 
but this is a likely consequence of the different methodological assumptions made by this 
model. Notably, this model estimates one production frontier for the whole period, while SFA 
computes a production frontier for each year, allowing changes over time in the technology. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, our focus is not to provide definitive measures of 
productivity through efficiency scores, but rather to obtain some evidence with respect to 
comparative issues for socialist countries. 
Most conclusions from the stochastic frontier approach are confirmed with the WITHIN 
model: the hierarchy of groups of countries is the same with socialist countries dominated by 
all other groups, while the rankings of socialist countries are similar with Yugoslavia above 
Hungary and Poland. We however observe some differences for the evolution in technical 
efficiency with the SFA results. In particular, there is now an increase in efficiency for   13
socialist countries between 1980 and 1987 with this model. This results from the fact that the 
increases in efficiency for Hungary and Poland are now higher, while the reduction for 
Yugoslavia is lower, than with the SFA model. The consequence is that we observe a 
reduction of the productivity gap between socialist countries and developing countries over 
the period. However this gap still increased between European socialist countries and 
developed countries, as the improvement in inefficiency was considerably greater in 
developed countries (+8.40)  than in socialist countries (+2.30). 
Table 4 records the significance levels for t-tests for comparisons between pairs of 
groups of countries for the mean efficiency scores in both frontier efficiency models. In both 
models, we observe that socialist countries have a efficiency mean significantly below than 
middle-income or developed countries, but not significantly than lower-income countries. 
Furthermore, when comparing pairwise other groups of countries, we point out a significant 
hierarchy between lower-income, middle-income and developed countries in ascending order 
for the SFA model. However, efficiency means with the WITHIN model are not significantly 
different. To conclude these significance tests, it has to be stressed that if we exclude the 
specific case of China, which is a lower-income country with a socialist system, the results of 
these tests are qualitatively similar. 
In addition to the wordy analysis of the similarities between both approaches for the 
estimation of efficiency scores, it is of utmost interest to investigate econometrically the 
robustness of both frontier approaches. Namely, we aim here to check whether both 
techniques provide similar rankings of countries for the levels and the evolutions. To do so, 
we compute the correlations of the rankings of the efficiency scores obtained with both 
techniques. Spearman coefficients of correlation are computed to compare mean efficiency 
scores over the period and variations in efficiency over the period. We observe very high 
positive rank correlations in both cases: the correlation coefficients are 0.986 and 0.816 
respectively for mean efficiency scores and for variations in efficiency, with both coefficients 
significant at the 1% level. This clearly supports the robustness of the frontier efficiency 
techniques. 
Consequently, our main conclusion is the underperformance of the Soviet socialist 
system in terms of technical efficiency. European socialist economies have lower efficiency 
levels than developed but also developing countries. Furthermore, the hierarchy of socialist 
countries supports the view that the market-oriented reforms favored productivity in socialist 
economies, meaning that the Soviet model of socialist economy is the least efficient one.   14
Table 2a 










N 3  25  34  25 
1980  60.67 70.04 78.21 80.68 
1981  60.06 70.51 77.75 80.90 
1982  59.55 70.44 76.94 81.38 
1983  61.74 70.94 76.57 82.27 
1984  55.67 67.95 74.28 82.81 
1985  57.53 70.35 75.11 82.68 
1986  59.90 71.62 76.54 83.21 
1987  58.84 71.39 76.86 83.32 
Evolution  80-87  -1.83 +1.35 -1.36 +2.64 
Average  59.25 70.41 76.53 82.15 
All scores in percentage. 
 
Table 2b 
Yearly efficiency scores for socialist countries: SFA model 
 
 Hungary  Poland  Yugoslavia 
1980 60.88  49.23  71.91 
1981 62.26  46.75  71.18 
1982 63.25  45.19  70.21 
1983 65.34  49.38  70.51 
1984 59.04  43.90  64.06 
1985 61.12  48.77  62.69 
1986 62.96  51.68  65.05 
1987 63.64  51.74  61.14 
Evolution 80-87  +2.76  +2.51  -10.77 
Average 62.31  48.33  67.09 




   15
Table 3a 










N 3  25  34  25 
1980  32.45 48.25 53.69 49.39 
1981  33.02 49.64 53.36 51.40 
1982  33.05 50.02 52.38 52.47 
1983  33.38 50.52 52.05 53.90 
1984  34.04 51.10 52.35 55.70 
1985  35.06 51.81 53.26 57.92 
1986  35.61 51.48 53.55 59.16 
1987  34.76 48.93 51.85 57.80 
Evolution  80-87  +2.30 +0.68 -1.84 +8.40 
Mean  33.92 50.22 52.81 54.72 
All scores in percentage. 
 
Table 3b 
Yearly efficiency scores for socialist countries: WITHIN model 
 
 Hungary  Poland  Yugoslavia 
1980 33.19  23.38  40.79 
1981 34.48  23.63  40.95 
1982 35.09  23.77  40.28 
1983 35.91  24.42  39.82 
1984 36.93  25.63  39.57 
1985 38.18  27.47  39.53 
1986 38.73  29.36  38.75 
1987 37.54  30.45  36.28 
Evolution 80-87  +4.35  +7.07  -4.51 
Mean 36.25  26.01  39.50 
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This new evidence needs to be put into perspective with former empirical and 
theoretical literature on the comparative productivity. Our results are in accordance with 
Bergson (1987), Moroney and Lovell (1997), Koop et al. (2000) who all found also a greater 
productivity in developed economies than in socialist economies. In comparison with Koop et 
al. (2000), we agree as well on the greater productive performance of Yugoslavia than of 
Poland. Nevertheless, unlike this work, we do not observe a productivity level for Yugoslavia 
similar to the most efficient countries. 
 
Table 4 
Significance levels for t-tests and p-value for difference in means across groups of countries 
 
  SFA model  WITHIN model 
transition vs. lower income  -1.22  (0.2334)  -1.38  (0.1790) 
transition vs. middle income -2.74***  (0.0096)  -2.17**  (0.0367) 
transition vs. developed -8.20***  (0.0001)  -5.65***  (0.0001) 
lower income vs. middle income  -1.82*  (0.0737)  -0.57  (0.5689) 
lower income vs. developed  -3.72***  (0.0005)  -1.08  (0.2861) 
middle income vs. developed  -2.55**  (0.0136)  -0.61  (0.5443) 
Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
On a theoretical basis, the possible explanations of the gap in technical efficiency 
between socialist and market economies are numerous. As described in section 2, the features 
of the socialist economies, which cross-country differences in their effective implementation, 
may worsen productivity. Public ownership, planning, lack of competition, and guaranteed 
employment, may not have provided the best incentives for managers and employees to 
perform well. Furthermore, the low openness of the economy may have contributed to put a 
brake on productivity growth by limiting the introduction of productive ideas, while the poor 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This research has analyzed the macroeconomic performance of European socialist 
economies in comparison with developing and developed countries, by estimating technical 
efficiency. It is indeed of utmost importance to assess the ability of European socialist 
countries to combine optimally factors of production in the perspective to explain the cross-
country differences in per capita income and in growth. 
Our major conclusion is the backwardness of European socialist countries in 
macroeconomic technical efficiency in comparison with developed countries, but also with 
developing countries. This result was found with both frontier efficiency models, which 
brings some robustness to this upshot. Furthermore, it emerges a clear hierarchy between the 
investigated European socialist countries with in ascending order Poland, Hungary, and 
Yugoslavia. As these rankings are in accordance with the degree of implementation of 
market-oriented reforms in socialist countries, these results support the view of the 
underperformance of the European socialist system in terms of macroeconomic technical 
efficiency. Thus, we conclude in favor of the commonly accepted view of a considerable 
waste of resources in former socialist economies in Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, the investigation of the evolution of macroeconomic performance shows 
different results depending of the frontier model. But both models agree on the increase of the 
gap in technical efficiency between socialist and developed countries during the eighties, 
which is an important result in the perspective of the failure of socialist countries to reach the 
income performances of the most advanced countries. 
Consequently, we have provided here new evidence to explain the economic failures of 
the socialist system in Eastern Europe. An interesting extension of this analysis would be the 
investigation of this issue on other periods to check the time-consistency of our results. It 
could notably be of utmost interest to know if the 50s, which is commonly admitted as the 
period of the highest growth of the USSR, was also characterized by a low macroeconomic 
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Annex 
 
Table A.1: Mean efficiency scores with the stochastic frontier approach 
 
Country  Efficiency score  Country  Efficiency score 
Algeria 81.16  Kenya  53.96 
Argentina 80.71  Korea.  Rep.  71.41 
Australia 82.71  Lesotho  61.68 
Austria 82.51  Malawi 49.72 
Bangladesh 91.44  Malaysia  77.44 
Belgium 84.11  Mali  82.66 
Benin 81.07  Mauritius  85.38 
Bolivia 63.98  Mexico 88.14 
Brazil 83.38  Mozambique  92.37 
Cameroon 83.99  Netherlands  84.66 
Canada 87.14  New  Zealand  80.94 
Central Africa  68.08  Nicaragua  76.71 
Chile 72.09  Norway  82.44 
China 46.56  Pakistan  82.46 
Colombia 80.65  Panama  73.28 
Costa Rica  77.84  Papua New Guinea  66.71 
Cyprus 73.59  Paraguay  75.89 
Denmark 81.03  Peru  70.25 
Dominican Republic  76.39  Philippines  59.75 
Ecuador 71.07  Poland  48.33 
Egypt 92.88  Portugal  78.25 
El Salvador  81.59  Rwanda  88.41 
Fiji 73.11  Senegal  85.43 
Finland 77.97  Singapore  81.53 
France 84.69  South  Africa  77.02 
Gambia 82.83  Spain  81.73 
Ghana 71.41  Sri  Lanka  78.10 
Greece 75.14  Sudan  66.55 
Guatemala 87.50  Sweden  83.73 
Guinea-Bissau 58.84  Switzerland  81.42 
Guyana 43.53  Syria  90.06 
Honduras 71.11  Thailand  70.66 
Hong Kong  88.83  Togo  45.72 
Hungary 62.31  Trinidad  and  Tobago  91.94 
Iceland 84.81  Tunisia 84.88 
India 58.95  Turkey  72.06 
Indonesia 67.47  Uganda  87.32 
Iran 83.99  United  Kingdom  86.14 
Ireland 78.37  USA  87.49 
Israel 82.84  Uruguay  75.55 
Italy 85.19  Yugoslavia  67.09 
Jamaica 55.98  Zambia 42.30 
Japan 76.61  Zimbabwe  63.12 
Jordan 87.80     
All scores in percentage.   21
Table A.2: Mean efficiency scores with the WITHIN model 
 
Country  Efficiency score  Country  Efficiency score 
Algeria 53.17  Kenya  31.64 
Argentina 53.24  Korea.  Rep.  44.73 
Australia 54.46  Lesotho  38.71 
Austria 54.14  Malawi 29.39 
Bangladesh 89.20  Malaysia  50.09 
Belgium 56.68  Mali  58.97 
Benin 56.54  Mauritius  63.28 
Bolivia 38.18  Mexico 67.74 
Brazil 56.59  Mozambique  93.85 
Cameroon 62.43  Netherlands  57.57 
Canada 63.15  New  Zealand  52.39 
Central Africa  43.48  Nicaragua  49.86 
Chile 44.81  Norway  53.33 
China 26.65  Pakistan  58.93 
Colombia 54.18  Panama  45.79 
Costa Rica  50.43  Papua New Guinea  39.45 
Cyprus 45.02  Paraguay  50.94 
Denmark 52.15  Peru  43.40 
Dominican Republic  49.42  Philippines  36.07 
Ecuador 43.56  Poland  26.01 
Egypt 98.21  Portugal  49.33 
El Salvador  56.61  Rwanda  77.03 
Fiji 45.83  Senegal  66.12 
Finland 47.70  Singapore  53.16 
France 56.91  South  Africa  48.93 
Gambia 61.71  Spain  53.15 
Ghana 47.48  Sri  Lanka  53.96 
Greece 46.44  Sudan  40.23 
Guatemala 67.35  Sweden  56.18 
Guinea-Bissau 32.93  Switzerland  52.18 
Guyana 23.20  Syria  75.57 
Honduras 44.62  Thailand  44.31 
Hong Kong  70.05  Togo  25.61 
Hungary 36.25  Trinidad  and  Tobago  85.57 
Iceland 57.64  Tunisia 60.75 
India 35.75  Turkey  43.83 
Indonesia 42.44  Uganda  81.65 
Iran 57.39  United  Kingdom  61.89 
Ireland 49.50  USA  64.28 
Israel 55.71  Uruguay  48.47 
Italy 58.09  Yugoslavia  39.50 
Jamaica 31.43  Zambia 22.73 
Japan 46.90  Zimbabwe  37.53 
Jordan 69.06     
All scores in percentage. 
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